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Abstract/ Policy Abstract 
 
The onset of a work-limiting disability coincides with an immediate decline in earnings with 
little recovery.  This study examines whether this relationship is attributable to the labor 
disincentives of disability insurance.  The data come from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation linked to administrative data from the Social Security Administration.  The 
analysis suggests that disability insurance accounts for little of the initial drop in earnings at the 
time of disability onset, but its effect may increase as time since disability onset elapses.  The 
results highlight the advantages of immediate, though temporary disability benefits. 
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I. Introduction 
The dynamic relationship between disability onset and earnings is well documented in the 
literature, but the mechanisms responsible for this relationship remain unknown. 1    Several 
recent studies show that, longitudinally, the onset of a work-limiting disability coincides with an 
immediate decline in earnings with little recovery (Charles 2003; Mok, Meyer, Charles, and 
Achen 2008; Meyer and Mok 2008).  Because earnings decline discretely, this relationship has 
been largely attributed to the causal effect of health on earnings.2
Another possible mechanism, and the focus of this study, is the labor disincentives of 
disability insurance.  The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides disability insurance 
through two programs: the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program and 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  One criterion for benefit eligibility is the inability to 
engage in substantial, gainful activity, which, in 2010, is the capacity to earn more than $1,000 
per month.  Because the criterion is defined by earnings, recently disabled individuals attempting 
to qualify for benefits may decrease earnings beyond the effect of the disability itself.  A large 
   
                                                          
1 Currie and Madrian (1999) provide a review of the literature on health and labor market 
outcomes. 
2 Another mechanism, and the subject of much research, is justification bias: individuals justify 
low labor market outcomes by reporting poor health, biasing upward the effect of health and 
earnings.  However, this bias is somewhat mitigated by a downward bias due to measurement 
error in health (Bound 1991).    
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body of literature measures the effect of disability insurance on labor supply more generally,3
The data for the study come from a unique match of survey data to administrative data 
maintained by the SSA.  The survey data come from several pooled panels of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which contain retrospective information on work-
limiting disabilities.  These data are matched to administrative data on longitudinal earnings, 
dates of disability application and receipt, and dates of death.  The match data are unique, as no 
other data source contains information on disability onset, longitudinal earnings, and disability 
insurance behavior.  Similar to previous studies, the analysis is limited to males. 
 but 
no study considers the extent to which insurance explains the dynamic relationship between 
health and earnings.  This study aims to address this gap. 
Retrospective data on work-limiting disabilities, combined with data on longitudinal 
earnings, show that earnings decrease precipitously at the time of disability onset and that the 
decrease is greater among the more severely disabled.  These patterns, consistent with those 
found in related literature, suggest a large, causal effect of health on earnings.  Using data on 
disability insurance, disability onset also coincides with sharp increases in disability application 
and receipt.  The largest increases occur among the totally disabled: from two years before to one 
year after disability onset, the percent applying for benefits increases from 1.9 to 26.8 percent, 
and the percent receiving benefits increases from 1.3 to 48.2 percent. 
The simultaneous decline in earnings and increase in disability application and receipt 
suggest that disability insurance may play an important role in the dynamic relationship between 
                                                          
3 Studies in this literature include Parsons (1980); Bound (1989); Borsch-Supan (2000); Gruber 
(2000); Black, Daniel, and Sanders (2002); Autor and Duggan (2003); Duggan, Singleton, and 
Song (2007); and Duggan, Rosenheck, and Singleton (2010).  
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disability onset and earnings.  Quantifying its precise role requires measuring the effect of 
disability application and receipt on earnings.  The strategy for measuring the effect is inspired 
by Bound (1989), who posits that, in the absence of disability insurance, labor outcomes for 
accepted applicants can be no better than the outcomes for rejected applicants.  If so, the effect of 
disability insurance on labor outcomes among accepted applicants is bounded by the observed 
labor outcomes of rejected applicants.  He concludes that fewer than 50 percent of accepted 
applicants would return to sustained work had they been denied.   
Extrapolating the logic of Bound, this study uses a third group – the disabled who never 
apply – to bound the effects of disability insurance on earnings.  The analysis suggests that 
disability insurance accounts for little of the initial drop in earnings at the time of disability 
onset, but its effect may be larger as time since disability onset elapses.  These conclusions are 
derived from a fixed-effects model that bounds the effects as well as a matching model that 
estimates them directly.  The results are largely attributable to the fact that individuals who 
report total disabilities exhibit declines in earnings regardless of whether they apply for benefits.   
Since Bound (1989), several studies bound the labor disincentive effects of disability 
insurance using the observed labor supply of rejected applicants (Bound, Burkhauser, and 
Nichols 2003; Chen and van der Klaauw 2008; Maestas and Yin 2008; and von Wachter, Song, 
and Manchester 2010).  A limitation of this strategy, as Bound (1989) and Parsons (1991) have 
noted, is that applying for benefits may adversely affect the labor outcomes of rejected.  As a 
result, the bound constructed from rejected applicants might understate the labor effects among 
accepted applicants had they never applied.  This study attempts to address this limitation using 
the observed labor supply of disabled non-applicants.  The matching estimates suggest that, 
among the sample studied, the percent of rejected applicants with positive earnings would be 
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about 10 percentage points higher - roughly 70 percent versus 60 percent – in the absence of 
disability insurance. 
II. Data 
The data for the study come from a unique match of survey data to administrative data 
from the SSA.  The survey data come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 
which are pooled across panel years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1996.  The administrative data 
include the Numident file, containing dates of death; the Detailed Earnings Record, reporting 
annual earnings from 1978 to 2004; the SSR, containing dates of SSI application and receipt; the 
831 file, containing dates of SSDI application; and the Master Beneficiary Record, reporting 
application and receipt dates for SSDI and retirement benefits.  The sample is restricted to survey 
data successfully matched to administrative data, which depends on whether the survey 
respondent reports a Social Security number and consents to the match. 
 Retrospective information on work-limiting disabilities is reported in topical module two 
of the SIPP.  In this module, survey respondents first report whether they currently have a 
disability that limits work and, if so, the year and month they became work-limited.  If work-
limited, respondents then report whether they currently have a disability that prevents work and, 
if so, the year and month they became work-prevented.  Disabled respondents are dropped from 
the sample if the date of disability onset is missing, if the work-prevention date precedes the 
work-limitation date, or if the date of disability onset occurs more than five years before the 
survey year.  The final restriction prevents the disabled sample from being overrepresented by 
the chronically disabled, because respondents are only asked about work disabilities at present, 
not about disabilities from which they have since recovered.  The final restriction also ensures 
that seven years of pre-disability earnings are available for the entire disabled sample. 
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 Finally, the sample is restricted to males whose reference ages range from 30 to 53.  For 
the disabled, the reference age is the age at disability onset; for the non-disabled, the reference 
age is the age at the time of the survey.  The age range reflects that earnings are examined seven 
years before to seven years after disability onset, so the analysis period covers ages 23 to 60.  
The sample also excludes respondents that received primary retirement benefits during the 
analysis period (95 respondents) or primary disability benefits before the analysis period (260 
respondents).  One observation is dropped for outlying earnings.   The final sample consists of 
37,323 observations. 
 
III. Summary of disability severity, earnings, and benefit application and receipt 
A. Disability Severity 
 The objective of this study is to account for disability insurance in the dynamic 
relationship between disability onset and earnings.  The relationship between disability and 
earnings has been the subject of recent studies using data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (Charles 2003; Mok, Meyer, Charles, and Achen 2008; Meyer and Mok 2008); 
however, no study examines this relationship using SIPP data matched to administrative 
earnings.  Thus, the first step of the analysis is to measure the relationship between disability and 
earnings using SIPP-matched data.   
The data are separated into three disability-severity groups: totally disabled, partially 
disabled, and non-disabled.  Assignment to these categories is based on retrospective information 
on work-limiting disabilities.  Totally disabled is defined as a transition from non-disabled to 
work-prevented from one calendar year to the next;  partially disabled is defined as a one-year 
transition from non-disabled to work prevented, though a subsequent transition to work 
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prevented is possible; and the non-disabled is defined as no report of a work-limiting disability.  
According to these definitions, 2.8 percent of the un-weighted sample is partially disabled, and 
1.6 percent is totally disabled.                              
1. Data summary by disability severity 
 The data, summarized in Table 1, show that disability severity is associated with several 
demographic and economic outcomes.  First, the disabled are less likely to be young, educated, 
white, married, and SSDI insured.  Being SSDI insured requires sufficient earnings in five of the 
10 years prior to the reference year and, as such, is a relevant indicator of labor force 
attachment.4
The table also reports three figures on the nature and context of the disabling condition: 
whether the disability resulted from an accident, whether the person was working at the time of 
disability onset, and whether the disability resulted from a work-related accident.  As shown, 
these figures do not differ substantially between the partially and totally disabled. 
  Second, the disabled exhibit greater rates of death, measured by the percent dead 
within seven years of the reference year.  Finally, the totally disabled are substantially more 
likely to apply for and receive disability benefits (SSDI and SSI) than the partially disabled, and 
the partially disabled more so than the non-disabled.  SSI also appears more material for the 
totally disabled than the partially disabled and non-disabled, indicated by the rate of SSDI or SSI 
relative to SSDI singly. 
2. Earnings by disability severity 
                                                          
4 More precisely, SSDI insured requires 20 quarters of coverage during the 40 quarters (10 years) 
prior to disability application.  In 2010, $1,120 in earnings is required to earn one quarter of 
coverage. 
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 The dynamic relationship between disability onset and average earnings is illustrated in 
panel A of Figure 1.  The figure plots average annual earnings spanning seven years before and 
after the reference year which, for the disabled, corresponds with the year of disability onset.  
The earnings estimates include zeros, though individual-year observations are excluded if the 
respondent is deceased. 
The panel reveals three notable patterns.  First, prior to disability onset, earnings of the 
totally disabled are lower than the earnings of the partially disabled, and earnings of the partially 
disabled are lower than those of the non-disabled. Second, average earnings decline precipitously 
at the time of disability onset among both disability groups, though the decline is greater for the 
totally disabled: from one year before to one year after disability onset, earnings of the totally 
disabled declined by 77.1 percent ($18,352), compared to 21.0 percent ($7,412) among the 
partially disabled.  Earnings do not recover after disability onset.5
An alternative to average earnings, which measures labor supply on the intensive margin, 
is any positive earnings, which measures labor supply on the extensive margin. The percent of 
individuals with positive earnings is plotted in Panel B of Figure 1.  As shown, before disability 
onset, the rates are similar between the partially disabled and non-disabled, but are slightly lower 
among the totally disabled.  At the time of disability onset, the percent trends downward among 
the partially disabled, but declines precipitously among the totally disabled.  Among the totally 
disabled, the estimate never drops below 25 percent and recovers slightly as time since disability 
onset elapses, despite the definition of total disability. 
 
                                                          
5 Charles (2003) finds that earnings appear to recover among the disabled shortly after the initial 
decline in earnings at the time of disability onset. 
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The raw earnings data reveal that disability onset is associated with a noticeable drop in 
earnings.  However, disability onset is associated with demographic factors which themselves 
affect earnings over time.  I account for observable differences between the disabled and 
nondisabled using a multivariate regression model, similar to the models by Jacobson, LaLonde, 
and Sullivan (1993); Stephens (2001); Charles (2003); and Meyer and Mok (2008).  The fixed-
effects model is given by 
(1) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑠𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is either earnings or an indicator of any positive earnings.  The coefficients 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝑡  
are individual and year fixed-effects, respectively.  𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a vector of time-varying controls for 
age (age and age squared), education (indicators of at least a high school diploma and college 
degree, both interacted with age and age squared), race (exclusive indicators of being white 
interacted with age and age squared), and marital status (an indicator of being married two years 
before the reference year interacted with age and age squared).  The coefficients on the time-
varying covariates and the year fixed effects are identified from both the disabled and the non-
disabled.6
 The estimates 𝛿𝑘𝑠 measure the association between disability onset and earnings.  Because 
of the individual fixed effects, and because of the left-out year, the coefficients reflect the within-
person change in earnings among the disabled relative to the year prior to disability onset.  The 
  𝐴𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑠  is an indicator of disability severity, denoted 𝑠, exactly 𝑘 years away from the 
reference year.  Leaving out the year prior to disability onset (𝑘 = −1), 𝑘 ranges from negative 
seven to positive seven.  𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
                                                          
6 For the disabled, the analysis period is limited to seven years before and after disability onset.  
For the non-disabled, the analysis period may extend beyond seven years of the reference year, 
but is restrained to the calendar years and ages that are covered by the disabled sample. 
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estimates of 𝛿𝑘𝑠 are reported in Panel A of Table 2.  As shown, prior to disability onset, earnings 
remain stable among the partially disabled, but decline slightly among the totally disabled.  At 
the time of disability onset, earnings decline precipitously among both groups, though the drop is 
greater among the totally disabled.  The earnings of the partially disabled do not appear to 
recover, remaining around $9,000 below pre-disability earnings.  The earnings of the totally 
disabled recover slightly, increasing from negative $20,000 two years after disability onset to 
negative $17,100 seven years after onset. 
 The estimates of 𝛿𝑘𝑠 for positive earnings are presented in Panel B of Table 2.  The 
pattern of the coefficients in Panel B is substantively similar to that in Panel A: rates of positive 
earnings remain stable prior to onset, decline at the time of onset, and slightly recover only 
among the totally disabled. 
3. Benefit application and receipt by disability severity 
 The data reveal that disability onset is associated with an immediate drop in earnings.  
However, the extent to which the drop reflects the causal effect of health on earnings remains 
unknown.  An obvious concern, and focus of this study, is the effect of SSDI and SSI on 
earnings, because these programs require individuals to have earnings below a certain threshold 
to qualify for benefits.    
The scope to which SSDI and SSI could explain the drop in earnings depends on the 
incidence of disability application and receipt at the time of disability onset: the greater the 
increase in benefit application and receipt, the greater the potential role of disability insurance in 
the dynamic relationship between disability onset and earnings.  I therefore plot rates of 
disability application and receipt with respect to the date of disability onset in panels A and B of 
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Figure 2.7
The simultaneous drop in earnings and increase in disability application and receipt 
suggest that disability insurance might explain some of the drop in earnings at the time of onset.  
On one hand, the effect of disability insurance on earnings may be greater among the totally 
disabled than the partially disabled, because the former are more likely to apply for and receive 
benefits.  On the other hand, the effect may be greater among the partially disabled who, 
ostensibly, are in better health and thus forgo more earnings to apply for and receive benefits.  
Determining the precise role of disability insurance in the relationship between disability and 
earnings, therefore, requires knowing the causal effect of disability insurance on earnings. 
  As shown, the date of disability onset coincides with sharp increases in both 
disability application and receipt.  Among the totally disabled, disability applications increase 
from 5.2 percent in the year preceding disability onset to 29.1 and 26.8 percent in the year during 
and after disability onset, respectively.  The corresponding rates for the partially disabled are 
0.71, 4.9, and 7.6.  The rates for both groups taper towards zero by year seven after disability 
onset.  In regards to receipt, only 4.3 percent of the totally disabled and 0.4 percent of the 
partially disabled were receiving disability benefits in the year prior to disability onset.  In the 
year immediately after onset, these rates increased to 55.1 and 8.5 percent.  Both rates tend to 
increase as time since disability onset elapses.   
B. Benefit application and receipt 
The causal effect of disability insurance on earnings is simple to define conceptually, 
though difficult to measure empirically.  Conceptually, the effect of applying for benefits is 
measured by the difference in earnings in the applicant and non-applicant states.  Likewise, the 
                                                          
7 The application rate includes initial applications, reconsiderations, and appeals for both SSDI 
and SSI.  The benefit receipt rate refers to the rate of both SSDI and SSI.  
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effect of receiving disability benefits is measured by the difference in earnings in the beneficiary 
and non-beneficiary states.  The empirical difficulty arises because earnings are only observed in 
one state for each individual.  Thus, estimating the effect for applicants and beneficiaries is 
tantamount to estimating counterfactual earnings had applicants not applied for – or had 
beneficiaries not received – benefits.  
 In a seminal paper, Bound (1989) estimates this type of counterfactual for the labor force 
participation of SSDI beneficiaries.  His empirical strategy presumes that, because of the 
disability screening process, rejected applicants are healthier than accepted applicants.  If so, and 
if the supply of and demand for labor supply are positively related to one’s health, then the 
disability screening process ensures that the labor market prospects for rejected applicants are 
better than those for accepted applicants.  Therefore, the counterfactual labor supply of accepted 
applicants is bounded by the observed labor supply of rejected applicants.   
Following Bound, I first consider earnings of rejected applicants as a bound on earnings 
of accepted applicants.  However, as Bound and others note, this strategy does not account for 
the possibility that the application process itself may adversely affects earnings.  I therefore 
examine the earnings of a third group: the disabled who do not apply for benefits. Shown by 
Lahiri, Song, and Wixon (2008), the likelihood of applying for benefits is negatively related to 
earnings in the non-applicant state.  Thus, earnings of non-applicants likely bound the potential 
earnings of rejected applicants, as well as accepted applicants, had they never applied. 
1. Data summary by benefit application and receipt  
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 The disabled sample is separated into three groups: accepted applicants, rejected 
applicants, and non-applicants.8
2. Earnings by benefit application and receipt 
  Summary statistics, presented in Table 3, reveal several broad 
patterns across groups.  First, compared to non-applicants, applicants are less likely to be young, 
educated, white, and married.  Second, accepted applicants are more likely to be totally disabled 
than rejected applicants, and rejected applicants more so than non-applicants.  Third, compared 
to rejected applicants and non-applicants, accepted applicants are less likely to be disabled from 
an accident and are significantly more likely to die by year seven after disability onset.  Finally, 
compared to rejected applicants and non-applicants, accepted applicants are less likely to be 
disabled from back pain, stiffness, or deformity, and more likely to be disabled from cancer, 
heart trouble, chronic kidney problems, or stroke. 
 Following Bound and others, average earnings of the recently disabled are plotted 
separately by application and receipt status.  These trends are shown in Panel A of Figure 3. As 
shown, prior to the reference year, earnings of rejected applicants were lower than the earnings 
of accepted applicants, and those of accepted applicants were lower than those of non-
applicants.9
                                                          
8 Accepted applicants are defined as applying for and receiving benefits during the analysis 
period; rejected applicants are defined as applying for but never receiving benefits during the 
analysis period; non-applicants are defined as never applying for or receiving benefits during the 
analysis period. 
  At the time of disability onset, earnings of all three groups decreased, but the 
declines are noticeably greater among the two applicant groups.  After the initial drop in 
9 Lahiri, Song, and Wixon (2008) find that, before applying, the earnings of rejected applicants 
are lower than the earnings of accepted applicants. 
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earnings, earnings of accepted applicants decrease, whereas earnings of rejected and non-
applicants rise.   
 The percent with positive earnings is plotted in Panel B of Figure 3.  As shown, before 
disability onset, the percent is similar across all three groups.  At the time of onset, the percent 
declines for all three groups, but declines substantially more among accepted applicants.  After 
disability onset, the percent trends downward among accepted applicants and upward among 
rejected applicants. 
  I first consider the earnings of rejected applicants as a bound on the earnings of accepted 
applicants had they been rejected.  The data reveal that, three years following disability onset, 
when most disability claims had been filed, 59.6 percent of rejected applicants have positive 
earnings.  Thus, had the accepted been rejected, at most, 60 percent of them would have positive 
earnings. 10
Mentioned above, a concern with a bound constructed from rejected applicants is that the 
application process itself may adversely affect earnings.  I therefore consider the earnings of 
non-applicants as a bound on the earnings of rejected and accepted applicants had they never 
applied.  Unfortunately, from Panels A and B of Figure 3, the bound constructed from non-
applicants is uninformative: compared to applicants, the earnings of non-applicants are 
substantially higher both before and after disability onset.  In the next section, an attempt is made 
to obtain more informative estimates of the effects of disability insurance on earnings. 
  This estimate is similar in magnitude to von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2010), 
who find that about 50 to 60 percent of young, rejected applicants have positive earnings two 
years after rejection.   
                                                          
10 This estimate cannot be directly compared to Bound’s (1989) because, in his study, the 
analysis sample is limited to males over the age of 45.   
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IV. The effect of benefit application and receipt on earnings 
 Two strategies are used to obtain tighter estimates of the effects of disability insurance on 
earnings.  The first strategy is an individual fixed-effects model, similar to (1), that arguably 
bounds the earnings effect.  The model generates tighter estimates by controlling for average 
earnings between individuals and for the effects of time-varying covariates.  The second strategy 
is a matching model that systemically pairs applicants to non-applicants – the difference in 
earnings between the pair is taken as the effect of disability insurance on earnings.  The 
difference between the two models is that the first bounds the earnings effect, whereas the 
second estimates it directly. 
A. Fixed-Effects Model 
 The fixed-effects model is similar to (1), but here, 𝑠 indexes the three states of application 
and receipt: accepted, rejected, and non-applicants.  The left-out group is the non-disabled.  As 
before, the model contains age; age squared; and the interactions of age and age squared with 
race, education, and marital status.  Average differences in earnings across individuals are 
absorbed by the individual fixed effects, so 𝛿𝑘𝑠 measures the within-person association between 
applicant status and earnings relative to the year prior to disability onset.   
 The values of 𝛿𝑘𝑠 are estimated simultaneously for accepted, rejected, and non-applicants; 
but for ease of exposition, the estimates are presented separately in the first columns of Tables 4 
and 5 – Table 4 contains the estimates for accepted applicants, denoted 𝛿𝑘𝐴; Table 5 contains the 
estimates for rejected applicants, denoted 𝛿𝑘𝑅.  According to the estimates for earnings, reported 
in Panel A, the drop in earnings at the time of disability onset is comparable between rejected 
and accepted applicants.  However, as time since disability onset elapses, earnings of rejected 
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applicants recover slightly, whereas earnings of accepted applicants decline.  By year seven after 
disability onset, the decline in earnings among accepted applicants is twice as large as the decline 
among rejected applicants: $22,300 versus $11,100. 
 The estimates for the likelihood of any positive earnings are reported in Panel B.  At the 
time of disability onset, the likelihood declines more among accepted than rejected applicants.  
As before, as time since disability elapses, the likelihood increases among rejected applicants 
and decreases among accepted applicants.  By year seven after disability onset, the likelihood is  
- 12 percentage points among rejected applicants and - 59.3 percentage points among accepted 
applicants. 
 The estimates of  𝛿𝑘𝐴 and  𝛿𝑘𝑅 simply measure the association between application status 
and earnings, so conceptually, they themselves serve as upper bounds of the earnings effect of 
disability application and receipt.  However, the estimates also reflect all other mechanisms that 
correlate health with earnings, including the causal effect of health on earnings, the causal effect 
of earnings on health, and the bias from individuals justifying low earnings with poor health.  
Netting out these other mechanisms, if possible, yields the effect of disability insurance on 
earnings:  𝛿𝑘𝐴  − 𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝐴 = 1] for accepted applicants and 𝛿𝑘𝑅 − 𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝑅 = 1] for rejected 
applicants, where 𝛿𝑘𝑁 is the drop in earnings when not applying.  The empirical difficulty arises 
because 𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝐴 = 1] and 𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝑅 = 1] are unobserved. 
 One strategy is to bound the differences  𝛿𝑘𝐴  − 𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝐴 = 1] and  𝛿𝑘𝑅 − 𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝑅 = 1] 
using the observed change in earnings among non-applicants: 𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝑁 = 1].  The bounding 
estimate requires that the observed drop in earnings among non-applicants would be smaller than 
the counterfactual drop in earnings among applicants in the non-applicant state: 𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝑁 = 1] >
𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝐴 = 1] and 𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝑁 = 1] > 𝐸[   𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝑅 = 1].  This assumption seems reasonable 
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considering that applicants are less educated, they report more severe disabilities, and they 
exhibit greater rates of death.  If the assumption is true, then in absolute value,  𝛿𝑘𝐴  −
𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑁|𝐴 = 1] is bounded by 𝛿𝑘𝐴 −  𝛿𝑘𝑁, and  𝛿𝑘𝑅 − 𝐸[  𝛿𝑘𝑅|𝐴 = 1] is bounded by 𝛿𝑘𝑅 −  𝛿𝑘𝑁.  
 The bounding estimates 𝛿𝑘𝐴 −  𝛿𝑘𝑁 and  𝛿𝑘𝑅 −  𝛿𝑘𝑁 are reported in Tables 4 and 5, 
respectively, under the heading “Diff-in-Diffs.”  (Estimates of  𝛿𝑘𝑁 are not reported separately.)  
As shown, the new bounds are smaller in absolute value than the baseline estimates, particularly 
at the time of disability onset.  The smaller bounds reflect that, at the time of disability onset, the 
earnings decline significantly among both applicants and non-applicants, illustrated in Figure 3.  
The bound remains relatively stable among rejected applicants, but becomes larger among 
accepted applicants as time since disability onset elapses, reflecting both an increase in earnings 
among non-applicants (smaller 𝛿𝑘𝑁 in absolute value) and a decrease in earnings accepted 
applicants (larger 𝛿𝑘𝐴 in absolute value).  By year seven after onset, the bound among accepted 
applicants reaches $17,700.  
B. Matching Estimates 
 The second strategy is a matching model.11
                                                          
11 The use of matching models in evaluating labor market programs is surveyed in Heckman, 
LaLonde and Smith (1999). 
  Conceptualized above, the effect of disability 
insurance on earnings is measured as the difference in earnings in the applicant and non-
applicant states.  Thus, in a given period, the effect of disability insurance on earnings among 
accepted applicants is measured by 𝑌(𝑁 = 1|𝐴 = 1) − 𝑌(𝐴 = 1|𝐴 = 1), denoted 𝛾𝐴, where 
𝑌(𝑁 = 1|𝐴 = 1) is counterfactual earnings in the non-applicant state conditional on being 
accepted.  Similarly, the effect among rejected applicants is given by 𝑌(𝑁 = 1|𝑅 = 1) − 𝑌(𝑅 =
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1|𝑅 = 1), denoted 𝛾𝑅, where 𝑌(𝑁 = 1|𝑅 = 1) is counterfactual earnings in the non-applicant 
state conditional on being rejected. 
 Unfortunately, 𝛾𝐴 and 𝛾𝑅 cannot be estimated because 𝑌(𝑁 = 1|𝐴 = 1) and 
𝑌(𝑁 = 1|𝑅 = 1) are unobserved.  However, they can be estimated using a matching model 
based on three identifying assumptions.  The first assumption is that, conditional on a set of 
factors Z, earnings in the non-applicant state are independent of application or receipt status: 
𝑌(𝑁 = 1|𝐴 = 1,𝑍) = 𝑌(𝑁 = 1|𝑅 = 1,𝑍) = 𝑌(𝑁 = 1|𝑁 = 1,𝑍) = 𝑌(𝑁 = 1|𝑍).  The second 
assumption is that, for each accepted and rejected applicant, there is an analogue non-
applicant: Pr(𝑁 = 1|𝑍) > 0.  The third assumption is that applying for or receiving disability 
benefits does not affect the conditioning factors Z.  Based on these assumptions, the effect of 
disability insurance on earnings can be estimated by pairing applicants to non-applicants based 
on Z: the average of earnings difference between pairs is the estimated effect of disability 
insurance on earnings. 
 Applicants are paired with non-applicants using a matching program developed by 
Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2004).  Applicants are matched to only one non-applicant 
using nearest neighbor matching with replacement.  Factors in Z include education (exclusive 
indicators of at least a high school diploma and a college degree); age at reference year; calendar 
year of the reference year; marital status two years prior to the reference year; disability 
insurance status at the time of disability onset; race (an indicator of being white); mortality (an 
indicator of death seven years after disability onset); state of residence (indicators of state of 
residence); average income over six years, spanning from seven to two years prior to the 
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reference year; and type of disabling condition.12
 The matching estimates for accepted applicants are reported in the final columns of 
Tables 4.  As shown, disability insurance explains less than a third of the drop in earnings at the 
time of disability onset: about $5,000 of the $16,900 drop in earnings in the year after onset is 
attributable to disability insurance.  However, disability insurance explains more as time since 
disability onset elapses.  By year seven after onset, $19,000 of the $22,300 drop in earnings is 
attributable to disability insurance.  A similar pattern emerges from the estimates for positive 
earnings, reported in Panel B of Table 4. 
  Applicants are also exactly matched to non-
applicants based on disability severity. 
 Matching estimates for rejected applicants are reported in the final columns of Table 5.  
Similar to accepted applicants, the effect of disability insurance on earnings is smallest at the 
time of disability onset and increases as time since onset elapses.  Comparing the estimates in 
Table 5 to those for accepted applicants in Table 4, disability insurance generally affects 
earnings more among accepted applicants, but explains a greater fraction of the overall decline in 
earnings among rejected applicants. 
C.  Counterfactual Earnings Trends of the Disabled in the Absence of Disability Insurance 
 The role of disability insurance in the dynamic relationship between disability onset and 
earnings can be illustrated by plotting the observed relationship, illustrated in Figure 1, 
alongside the counterfactual relationship in the absence of disability insurance.  The 
counterfactual can now be constructed using the estimated effect of disability insurance on 
earnings.  In particular, if observed earnings in period k for disability severity group s is 
                                                          
12 When matching applicants to non-applicants, the weight assigned to each covariate is inversely 
related to its variance, a technique that accounts for the different scales of the covariates.  
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denoted 𝑦�𝑘𝑠, then counterfactual earnings in the absence of disability insurance is 𝑦�𝑘𝑠 − 𝑝𝑘𝑠𝐴𝛾�𝑘𝐴 −
𝑝𝑘𝑠𝑅𝛾�𝑘𝑅, where 𝑝𝑘𝑠𝐴 is the percent of individuals that are accepted, 𝑝𝑘𝑠𝑅 is the percent of individuals 
that are rejected, and 𝛾�𝑘𝐴 and 𝛾�𝑘𝑅 are the matching estimates of effect of disability insurance on 
earnings.13
 The observed and counterfactual trends are illustrated in Figure 4 for the partially 
disabled and in Figure 5 for the totally disabled.  Within each figure, the trends in earnings are 
illustrated in Panel A, and the trends in positive earnings are illustrated in Panel B.  In general, 
the illustrations indicate that disability insurance plays a minor role at the time of disability 
onset, but its role increases as time since disability onset elapses.  For the totally disabled, the 
difference between counterfactual and actual earnings in the year after onset is $4,500, and the 
difference in the percent with positive earnings is 6.6 points.   By year seven following onset, 
these differences are $14,100 and 34.1 points, respectively. 
 
 
V. Additional Considerations 
A. Disability Severity 
 The matching estimates in Table 4 and 5 measure the effect of disability insurance on 
earnings among all accepted and rejected applicants regardless of disability severity.  An obvious 
question is whether the effect of disability insurance varies by disability severity.  The answer 
can be surmised from Figures 6 and 7, which plot earnings by application and receipt status and 
disability severity.  Earnings of the partially disabled are plotted in Figure 6; earnings of the 
                                                          
13 The calculation of counterfactual earnings assumes that the effect of disability insurance on 
earnings is the same among the partially and totally disabled.  The possibility that the effect 
varies by disability severity is examined in the next section.  
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totally disabled are plotted in Figure 7.  Among the partially disabled, only the earnings of 
applicants decline at the time of disability onset.  In contrast, earnings of the totally disabled 
decline regardless of disability application.   Taken together, the figures suggest potentially large 
effects of disability insurance among the partially disabled, but negligible effects among the 
totally disabled, particularly at the time of disability onset. 
B. Back and Spine Problems 
 The SSA uses a single criterion to determine medical eligibility: the beneficiary must be 
unable to engage in substantial, gainful activity.  However, evaluating musculoskeletal 
conditions and mental illness requires more subjectivity than conditions like stroke and cancer.  
A policy concern is whether greater subjectivity leads to higher rates of false-positive awards 
and, as a result, to larger adverse effects on labor supply.  To address this concern, I repeat the 
entire analysis for males who report that a back or spine problem limits work.  The focus on this 
condition is important: 31.2 percent of all disabled worker awards in 2009 are attributable to 
musculoskeletal and connective tissue conditions (SSA 2009).  Moreover, problems with the 
back and spine are the most common disabilities reported in the SIPP.  According to Table 3, 
these disabilities are less common among accepted applicants relative to rejected applicants and 
non-applicants.         
 The observed and counterfactual trends in earnings are reported in Figures 8 and 9.  
Figure 8 corresponds with the partially disabled; Figure 9 corresponds with the totally disabled.  
As before, there is little difference between observed and counterfactual earnings at the time of 
disability onset, suggesting that the drop in earnings when a back or spine problem manifests is 
not driven by disability insurance.  With time, however, counterfactual earnings increase and 
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observed earnings remain stagnant, again suggesting that the effect of disability insurance on 
earnings may increase with time. 
C. Earnings Uncertainty 
 Studies documenting the dynamic relationship between disability onset and earnings 
focus on changes in earnings on average. However, another source of welfare loss that may be 
associated with disability onset is increased earnings uncertainty (Currie and Madrian 1999).  
The increase in uncertainty may arise from productivity risk - for example, increased bed days - 
and from employment risk – for example, increased fluctuations in labor demand from disabled 
workers.14  The effect of health on earnings uncertainty is important because, as earnings 
uncertainty increases, so too does the incentive to apply for disability benefits.15
 Using the date of disability onset, combined with the data on longitudinal earnings data, I 
examine whether disability onset is associated with increased earnings uncertainty.  Two factors 
complicate the analysis.  First, shown above, many of the disabled apply for and receive 
disability benefits at the time of disability onset, so their earnings will not reflect the degree of 
uncertainty had they remained in the labor market.  For this reason, the disabled sample is 
limited to those who do not apply for benefits.  Second, earnings of the disabled are often 
bounded at zero, so the standard measure of variance would be lower than if earnings were not 
     
                                                          
14 A framework for distinguishing between productivity risk and employment risk is developed 
by Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010). 
15 Kreider (1998) calculates that applications to SSDI are 15 percent higher than they would be in 
the absence of earnings risk prior to application.  However, the study does not take into account 
the degree to which disability onset affects earnings uncertainty. 
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bounded.  Therefore, the effect of disability onset on the variance of earnings is estimated using 
interval regression, which models earnings bounded at zero. 
 Latent earnings are modeled as: 
𝑁(𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃1𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝜂0 + 𝜂1𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂2𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂3𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡) 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of disability status, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of post-reference year, and 𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡 
is an indicator of post-disability onset among the disabled.  The vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a set of observable 
characteristics that includes age, age squared, race (white), education (high school diploma and 
college degree), and marital status.  As shown, the variance of latent earnings depends on both 
disability status and disability status after the reference year.  The coefficient 𝜂3 measures the 
degree to which disability onset affects earnings variance. 
 The interval regression estimates are presented in Table 6.  As shown, disability onset is 
associated with a $14,700 decline in average earnings (Panel A), but is not associated with a 
significant increase in earnings variance (Panel B).  
 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
 Several recent studies examine the dynamic relationship between disability onset and 
income.  This work is motivated by the fact that the optimal level of disability insurance 
depends, in part, on the causal effect of health on earnings.  However, measuring the causal 
effect of health on earnings is complicated by the fact that disability insurance itself may affect 
earnings, particularly at the time of a health shock.  Thus, to determine the optimal level of 
disability insurance, it is necessary to account for the role of insurance in the dynamic 
relationship between disability onset and earnings. 
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 The preliminary results from this study suggest that disability insurance may go a long 
way in explaining the relationship between disability and earnings: at the time of onset, earnings 
decrease and disability application and receipt increase.  However, further analysis reveals that 
the recently disabled exhibit declines in earnings regardless of disability application, suggesting 
that the role of disability insurance in the initial drop in earnings is minor.  The effect of 
disability insurance on earnings is potentially larger as time since disability onset elapses, 
because while earnings of accepted applicants decrease, earnings of non-applicants recover. 
 What do these findings imply for policy?  An important policy question is whether SSDI 
or SSI beneficiaries could otherwise work.  This study suggests that, had the accepted never 
applied, their capacity for work would be initially low, but may improve with time.  Thus, to 
discourage SSDI and SSI applications and encourage long-run work, the initial drop in earnings 
could be insured with immediate, though temporary disability benefits.  The SSDI program, in 
contrast, targets long-term disabilities with benefits available five months after onset.  Because 
the counterfactual in this study is whereby the beneficiary never applies, the results do not imply 
that accepted applicants could otherwise work several years after receiving benefits.  Thus, the 
results neither support nor disparage the use of continuing disability reviews, where the case of a 
disabled worker beneficiary is re-evaluated after years of receiving benefits.    
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Panel A: Average Earnings 
 
Panel B: Positive Earnings 
 
Figure 1: Earnings by Disability Severity 
Reference year zero refers to the date of disability onset for the partially and totally disabled. 
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Panel A: Disability Applications 
 
 
Panel B: Disability Receipt 
 
Figure 2: Disability Application and Receipt by Disability Severity 
Reference year zero refers to the date of disability onset for the partially and totally disabled. 
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Panel A: Average Earnings 
 
Panel B: Positive Earnings 
 
Figure 3: Earnings by Disability Application and Receipt Status 
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Panel A: Average Earnings 
 
Panel B: Positive Earnings 
 
Figure 4: Observed and Counterfactual Earnings of the Partially Disabled 
Counterfactual represents the upper bound of earnings of the partially disabled had none 
applied for disability benefits. 
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Panel A: Average Earnings 
 
Panel B: Positive Earnings 
 
Figure 5: Observed and Counterfactual Earnings of the Totally Disabled 
Counterfactual represents the upper bound of earnings of the totally disabled had none applied 
for disability benefits. 
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Panel A: Average Earnings 
 
Panel B: Positive Earnings 
 
Figure 6: Earnings by Disability Application and Receipt Status: Partially Disabled 
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Panel A: Average Earnings 
 
Panel B: Positive Earnings 
 
Figure 7: Earnings by Disability Application and Receipt Status: Totally Disabled 
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Panel A: Average Earnings 
 
Panel B: Positive Earnings 
 
Figure 8: Observed and Counterfactual Earnings of the Partially Disabled: Back and Spine Pain 
Counterfactual represents the upper bound of earnings of the partially disabled had none 
applied for disability benefits. 
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Panel A: Average Earnings 
 
Panel B: Positive Earnings 
 
Figure 9: Observed and Counterfactual Earnings of the Totally Disabled: Back and Spine Pain 
Counterfactual represents the upper bound of earnings of the partially disabled had none 
applied for disability benefits. 
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Table 1 
   Data Summary by Disability Severity: Males ages 30 to 48 
  Non-Disabled Partially Disabled Totally Disabled 
Reference Age 40.0 41.1 42.2 
 
(0.03) (0.21) (0.28) 
High School 57.8 65.8 55.1 
 
(0.26) (1.5) (2.1) 
College 30.8 13.6 7.1 
 
(0.24) (1.1) (1.1) 
White 86.9 86.5 73.6 
 
(0.18) (1.1) (1.9) 
Married 73.6 68.8 61.5 
 
(0.23) (1.4) (2.1) 
SSDI Insured 87.2 86.6 77.6 
 
(0.18) (1.1) (1.8) 
SSDI Application 4.3 27.7 66.2 
 
(0.11) (1.4) (2.0) 
SSDI Receipt 2.7 17.5 55.4 
 
(0.09) (1.2) (2.1) 
SSDI or SSI Application 4.9 30.2 79.7 
 
(0.11) (1.4) (1.7) 
SSDI or SSI Receipt 3.0 19.6 65.8 
 
(0.09) (1.2) (2.0) 
Accident - 53.5 48.4 
  
(1.5) (2.1) 
Working - 95.0 90.1 
  
(0.67) (1.3) 
Work Accident - 37.8 36.2 
  
(1.5) (2.0) 
Dead within 7 Years 1.9 5.3 10.2 
 
(0.07) (0.69) (1.3) 
Observations 35724 1044 555 
Figures are computed from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, pooled over survey 
years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1996.  Totally disabled is defined as a one-year transition 
from being non-disabled to work-prevented; partially disabled is defined as a one-year transition 
from being non-disabled to work-limited, but a subsequent transition to being work-prevented is 
possible.  The data do not include individuals disabled more than five years before the survey 
date.   Married refers to marital status two years before the reference year.  SSDI insured reflects 
insured status during the reference year.  Application for and receipt of SSDI and SSI benefits is 
measured during the seven years before and after the reference year.  
Table 2 
     Dynamic Relationship between Disability and Earnings 
 
Partially Disabled 
 
Totally Disabled 
Years Since 
Disability 
Fixed-Effect 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error   
Fixed-Effect 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
Panel A: Earnings 
-7 2.0 0.99* 
 
4.7 1.1** 
-6 1.2 0.9 
 
3.7 1.0** 
-5 2.0 0.90* 
 
3.1 0.98** 
-4 1.3 0.79* 
 
2.2 0.84** 
-3 1.6 0.69* 
 
2.6 0.77** 
-2 1.2 0.48** 
 
1.4 0.61* 
-1 
     0 -4.4 0.58** 
 
-7.7 0.66** 
1 -7.7 0.78** 
 
-18.5 0.95** 
2 -8.1 0.84** 
 
-19.9 1.0** 
3 -8.3 1.0** 
 
-19.9 1.0** 
4 -9.6 0.95** 
 
-18.8 1.1** 
5 -9.3 0.95** 
 
-18.7 1.1** 
6 -8.5 1.0** 
 
-17.9 1.1** 
7 -8.9 1.0** 
 
-17.1 1.1** 
 
Panel B: Positive Earnings 
-7 -0.7 1.3 
 
1.6 2.1 
-6 -0.5 1.4 
 
-0.3 2.3 
-5 0.0 1.3 
 
-1.9 2.2 
-4 -0.3 1.2 
 
-3.1 1.9 
-3 0.2 1.0 
 
0.7 1.8 
-2 1.6 0.8 
 
1.1 1.6 
-1 
     0 0.5 0.9 
 
-5.7 1.7** 
1 -6.0 1.3** 
 
-39.6 2.5** 
2 -7.7 1.4** 
 
-49.2 2.5** 
3 -8.4 1.5** 
 
-51.2 2.6** 
4 -10.5 1.6** 
 
-50.7 2.6** 
5 -10.9 1.7** 
 
-48.2 2.7** 
6 -10.5 1.7** 
 
-48.1 2.8** 
7 -12.4 1.7**   -43.7 2.7** 
The earnings estimates are derived from an individual fixed-effects model.  The model includes 
year fixed effects, age, age squared, and the interactions of age and age squared with race, 
education, and marital status. * and ** indicate significance at the five and one percent level.  
Table 3 
   Data Summary by Disability Application and Receipt Status: Disabled Males ages 30 to 48 
  Accepted Rejected Non-Applicants 
Reference Age 43.5 39.9 40.6 
 
(0.27) (0.47) (0.23) 
High School 54.7 66.7 66.0 
 
(2.1) (3.5) (1.6) 
College 7.5 3.5 15.6 
 
(1.1) (1.4) (1.3) 
White 76.5 77.1 86.8 
 
(1.8) (3.1) (1.2) 
Married 63.9 60.3 69.2 
 
(2.0) (3.6) (1.6) 
SSDI Insured 83.4 84.5 83.1 
 
(1.6) (2.7) (1.3) 
Totally Disabled 64.6 41.4 13.6 
 
(2.0) (3.6) (1.2) 
Accident 40.1 62.9 57.2 
 
(2.0) (3.6) (1.7) 
Working 91.8 93.0 94.4 
 
(1.1) (1.9) (0.79) 
Work Accident 28.3 49.3 40.6 
 
(1.9) (3.7) (1.7) 
Dead within 7 Years 12.8 4.0 3.7 
 
(1.4) (1.4) (0.65) 
Back or Spine Problem 29.4 44.2 37.4 
 
(1.9) (3.7) (1.7) 
Cancer 4.3 0.0 2.0 
 
(0.84) - (0.49) 
Heart Trouble 10.7 5.5 8.6 
 
(1.3) (1.7) (0.97) 
High Blood Pressure 1.1 4.5 1.8 
 
(0.44) (1.5) (0.46) 
Chronic Kidney Problems 2.6 0.4 1.3 
 
(0.67) (0.45) (0.39) 
Stiffness or Deformity 2.1 4.5 8.9 
 
(0.59) (1.5) (0.98) 
Stroke 4.3 0.9 1.0 
 
(0.85) (0.70) (0.34) 
Observations 573 185 841 
See Table 1 for sample selection. 
Table 4 
      Upper-Bound Estimates of Disability Benefits on Earnings: Accepted Applicants 
  Fixed-Effects Diff-in-Diffs Matching 
Years Since 
Disability Estimate 
Standard 
Error Estimate 
Standard 
Error Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
A. Earnings 
-7 5.5 1.4** 3.3 1.7* 1.4 2.6 
-6 3.3 1.0** 1.6 1.4 -0.7 2.2 
-5 2.8 1.0** 0.4 1.4 -0.5 2.4 
-4 1.7 0.84* 0.1 1.2 -0.9 2.1 
-3 1.1 0.8 -1.2 1.1 -3.4 2.1 
-2 0.8 0.6 -0.6 0.8 -3.7 2.2 
-1 
    
-3.6 2.2 
0 -7.0 0.69** -2.8 0.94** -2.9 2.1 
1 -16.9 0.97** -9.9 1.3** -5.0 1.9** 
2 -19.4 1.0** -12.7 1.4** -8.0 1.7** 
3 -20.7 1.0** -14.7 1.6** -12.2 2.0** 
4 -21.1 1.1** -14.5 1.5** -15.1 2.1** 
5 -22.2 1.1** -16.6 1.5** -16.9 2.0** 
6 -22.2 1.1* -17.6 1.6** -17.9 2.4** 
7 -22.3 1.1** -17.7 1.6** -19.0 2.1** 
 
A. Positive Earnings 
-7 0.2 2.0 -0.2 2.5 2.2 3.6 
-6 1.2 1.9 2.7 2.5 3.3 3.5 
-5 -1.0 2.0 -0.3 2.4 3.5 3.6 
-4 -1.6 1.7 0.3 2.2 3.0 3.3 
-3 -0.6 1.7 -0.4 2.1 -3.0 3.4 
-2 0.7 1.5 -0.5 1.8 -0.6 3.6 
-1 
    
-3.7 3.5 
0 -4.1 1.5** -4.0 1.9* -0.1 4.1 
1 -33.0 2.4** -25.5 2.8** -9.5 4.9 
2 -44.4 2.5** -37.9 2.9** -24.2 4.7** 
3 -49.7 2.6** -43.4 3.0** -32.2 4.7** 
4 -54.7 2.5** -48.2 3.0** -38.0 4.8** 
5 -55.2 2.5** -50.1 3.0** -43.0 4.7** 
6 -56.7 2.6** -52.7 3.0** -44.7 5.0** 
7 -59.3 2.4** -56.2 2.9** -51.5 4.6** 
The difference-in-differences estimates are the difference of the fixed-effect estimates between 
the accepted and non-applicants; the matching estimates are derived from matching accepted 
applicants to non-applicants based on health, income, and demographic characteristics.  * and ** 
indicate significance at the five and one percent level. 
Table 5 
      Upper-Bound Estimates of Disability Benefits on Earnings: Rejected Applicants 
  Fixed-Effects Diff-in-Diffs Matching 
Years Since 
Disability Estimate 
Standard 
Error Estimate 
Standard 
Error Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
 
A. Earnings 
-7 2.0 1.9 -0.2 2.1 -3.4 2.0 
-6 1.3 1.7 -0.3 2.0 -3.3 2.1 
-5 1.0 1.5 -1.3 1.8 -3.1 2.0 
-4 0.8 1.4 -0.9 1.7 -4.1 1.9* 
-3 2.3 1.0* 0.0 1.3 -3.8 2.0 
-2 1.4 0.8 0.0 1.0 -4.1 2.1* 
-1 
    
-5.1 2.1* 
0 -7.0 1.1** -2.9 1.3* -6.6 2.0** 
1 -14.7 1.5** -7.8 1.8** -8.8 2.0** 
2 -14.3 1.6** -7.6 1.8** -10.5 2.3** 
3 -14.7 1.7** -8.8 2.0** -13.1 2.3** 
4 -13.6 1.7** -7.0 2.0** -13.4 2.5** 
5 -13.0 1.7** -7.4 2.0** -13.0 2.4** 
6 -11.9 1.8** -7.3 2.1** -12.9 2.3** 
7 -11.1 1.7** -6.5 2.0** -13.6 2.5** 
 
A. Positive Earnings 
-7 -1.4 3.7 -1.8 4.0 -3.1 4.4 
-6 -1.1 4.6 0.4 4.9 -1.5 4.2 
-5 0.6 4.0 1.3 4.3 0.1 4.1 
-4 2.5 3.6 4.4 3.8 0.6 3.6 
-3 6.2 2.1** 6.4 2.4** 0.6 3.6 
-2 4.9 2.0* 3.7 2.3 0.4 4.2 
-1 
    
-4.9 4.1 
0 -1.4 2.3 -1.2 2.6 2.3 4.4 
1 -17.7 3.9** -10.2 4.2* -2.7 5.1 
2 -26.2 4.1** -19.6 4.4** -13.0 5.1** 
3 -21.2 4.8** -14.9 5.1** -12.2 5.3* 
4 -16.4 4.2** -9.9 4.5* -6.7 5.6 
5 -17.0 4.2** -12.0 4.5** -12.5 5.7* 
6 -16.5 4.6** -12.5 4.9* -12.3 5.4* 
7 -12.0 4.3** -8.9 4.6 -8.2 5.6 
The difference-in-differences estimates are the difference of the fixed-effect estimates between 
the rejected and non-applicants; the matching estimates are derived from matching rejected 
applicants to non-applicants based on health, income, and demographic characteristics. * and ** 
indicate significance at the five and one percent level. 
Table 6 
  Interval Regression Estimates (in $1000) 
 
Coefficients Std. Error 
A. Mean 
  Disabled  1.9 3.9 
Post 2.6 3.8 
Disabled*Post -14.7 3.6** 
Age  5.5 0.13** 
Age Squared -0.06 0.0019** 
White 13.0 0.33** 
High School 
Diploma 19.6 0.46** 
College Degree 46.9 2.7** 
Married 13.0 0.77** 
Constant -128.2 5.6** 
   B. Variance 
  Disabled -1.2 0.24** 
Post -0.15 0.25 
Disabled*Post 0.25 0.26 
Constant 4.8 0.24** 
The sample is restricted to the non-disabled and 
disabled non-applicants.  ** indicates significance 
at the one percent level.  
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